The Republic of Moldova is preparing for 2024, a year marked by two aspects of major importance: the opening of negotiations on accession chapters with the European Union and the presidential elections. However, the regional context remains just as murky due to the uncertainties and vulnerabilities created by the Russian military invasion of Ukraine, an external theatre of war with reverberations inside Moldova.

The pro-Russian political forces from the separatist Transnistrian region, but also from the Gagauz autonomy in southern Moldova, can always create hotbeds of instability for Moldova and the pro-European government in Chisinau. The pro-Russian political forces will also contribute to creating a political climate of uncertainty, a situation that suits Moscow's political-military goals.

With the green light received from the European Council on 14 December 2023, Moldova will enter the phase in which it will have to accelerate sectoral reforms on all 33 accession chapters. All eyes will surely be on the justice reform, where the system will be fiercely opposing the reforms.

The fight will not be an easy one and will stretch over the coming years. No one expects progress overnight, although this was the slogan the ruling party when it came to power in July 2021. The expectations were then raised far too high against a background of endemic corruption in the system.

Here, however, the government will also have to make fine adjustments in order not to give the impression that the justice reform must be imposed by political force on the magistrates. And there must be an intrinsic will among the magistrates to reform, without hiding behind the excuse of political interference in this process. First of all, this is a political process and then one of the judicial guild, after we all could see that the system is not capable of reformation from within.

Also, there is a need to strengthen the defence capabilities of the Republic of Moldova. Chisinau must provide itself with a minimum of security and defence, even if it has strong partners on the security side. This effort will also strengthen the dissuasive capacity of the Moldovan Army and change the balance of forces compared to the Transnistrian paramilitary forces, led at the top by people from Russia's intelligence structures.

Last but not least, there is a need to develop contingency plans regarding the Transnistrian region for the reintegration of the region into the de facto borders of the Republic of Moldova and to avoid an economic and humanitarian crisis, in the event that the free Russian gas will no longer arrive in the region. Ukraine has clearly said that it will no longer allow the transit of Russian gas at the end of 2024. Also, the Republic of Moldova must be prepared economically, as well as politically, to reintegrate Transnistria.

In addition, the Moldovan authorities must make contingency plans for participating in the reconstruction of Ukraine, because this security crisis can also bring economic opportunities for the Republic of Moldova. In this sense, the most practical would be to have a coordinated plan of cooperation with Romania as transit countries through which various goods and flows of goods will enter for the reconstruction of this war-torn country.

In other words, the Republic of Moldova must transform from a reactive to a pro-active country with anticipatory capabilities that builds tools and reserves to be able to act quickly in the sense of increased navigation capabilities through these troubled waters in which it is directly involved.