Analysis by Mădălin Necșuțu, journalist at TVR Moldova and Balkan Insight, for FES/APE foreign policy newsletter.

Resolving the Transnistrian issue remains an enigma or, rather, an equation with multiple unknowns. It is difficult to anticipate how this file will evolve. On the one hand, it is clear that Russia does not wish to relinquish control over the region or abandon this bridgehead that it has used, in various forms, for more than a hundred years.

On the other hand, it is equally evident that the Republic of Moldova currently lacks both the socio economic capacity and the security capabilities to reintegrate the small separatist region, which represents approximately 11% of its territory. Moreover, the outcome of the war in Ukraine could reshape discussions on Transnistria along lines different from those currently in place.

For these reasons, the Transnistrian file remains “in limbo,” characterized by a volatile evolution that could lead to multiple possible outcomes—or none at all. At present, Chișinău considers reintegration of the territory before accession to the European Union as the preferable option.

Given that accession is realistically set for 2030, with discussions about a possible acceleration toward 2028, the Transnistrian issue would, under this scenario, have approximately 2–4 years to be resolved. The situation would become even more complicated if the pro-European authorities in Chișinău were to push for a referendum on unification with Romania. In such a case, we would be speaking of an entirely different strategy, and matters would grow significantly more complex.

What is evident, however, is that the European Union will no longer accept a frozen conflict within its borders—let alone the presence of Russian troops on its territory, such as those stationed for over three decades on the left bank of the Dniester. This reality could generate tensions and even a potential casus belli between Moscow and the EU or NATO.

Therefore, matters are extremely complicated at this moment. Even Russia no longer exercises full control over the situation in Transnistria. If the EU were to block the current scheme for delivering Russian gas to the region—via payment agents in the United Arab Emirates and suppliers in EU member states considered friendly toward Russia— the situation surrounding the Transnistrian file could become even more complicated.

A Process in Motion

What is certain is that the reintegration process has already begun in a certain form, and Chișinău’s strategy appears to be working. More precisely, it involves projecting and consolidating a superior economic model. The right bank has long surpassed the left bank in terms of quality of life.

Today, a significant portion of the private-sector workforce from the Transnistrian region comes to work on the right bank. Many people commute daily or choose to relocate permanently to live there. Factories and companies in the Republic of Moldova employ, in considerable numbers, Moldovan citizens from the Transnistrian region. This is an undeniable reality.

Moreover, more and more residents of the Transnistrian region seek medical services on the right bank. At the same time, impoverishment on the left bank of the Dniester is accelerating. Russia no longer possesses the strength, leverage, or financial resources it once had to support this small separatist republic.

The Sunset of Transnistria’s “Eldorado” Era

Even the business empire of the mammoth company Sheriff is no longer performing as it once did. A significant portion of Sheriff Group’s liquid capital has, for some time, moved to European countries such as Germany. As a result, the Transnistrian region is beginning to creak from a business standpoint and no longer represents the gold mine or “cash cow” it once was.

This is especially true given that the region is no longer umbilically linked to the port of Odesa, from which substantial revenues once flowed through smuggling and trafficking in weapons, drugs, and human beings. Crime in the region is no longer connected to ex-Soviet mafia networks or to Chișinău to the same extent as before. Thus, from being Europe’s “black hole,” the Transnistrian region risks becoming, under its current leadership model, an unattractive wreck—even for major organized crime networks.

Under these circumstances, the current separatist regime appears to be hanging by a thread. It is unclear whether its leaders are negotiating an exit from the region or whether they will remain loyal to Moscow to the very end—the same Moscow that once enabled their financial prosperity. We cannot anticipate whether the current leadership will abandon ship before it sinks or cling to the status quo until the last possible moment.

Yet even this is not the most important issue. What matters most is what Chișinău will do to reintegrate this region. One thing is certain: without massive financial support from the European Union, the Republic of Moldova will not be able to resolve this problem on its own.

From Fear to Action on Frozen Conflicts

The Transnistrian region should not be viewed in Brussels merely as a black hole, but also as an opportunity. Against the backdrop of enlargement fatigue—visible since 2013—the EU could take the initiative in the Transnistrian file and use this opportunity to demonstrate leadership. Financial resources and political will are needed, and these can be mobilized within a few years. The Republic of Moldova, despite the complexity of its challenges, can become a model of political success for the EU—an example of the Union’s capacity to help resolve a problem left behind by Russia.

Looking ahead, resolving the Transnistrian file could serve as a model for addressing other frozen conflicts in the Black Sea basin. The reconstruction of Ukraine, as well as the situations in Crimea, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, could eventually follow a similar trajectory—provided Russia does not emerge victorious from its military invasion of Ukraine.

Thus, every crisis can also be transformed into an opportunity. Brussels should not approach the Transnistrian file with fear or indifference; on the contrary, it could use this experience to project leadership and soft power beyond its borders, in a world where competition is becoming the defining keyword.

In conclusion, although at first glance the Transnistrian file appears extremely complicated, it can also function as a laboratory for smart EU policies aimed at reducing Russian influence in Europe. A Russia that maintains various “thorns” within the European space does not contribute to the continent’s consolidation.

On the contrary, such artificial enclaves—created and activated periodically by Moscow according to its interests—maintain structural vulnerabilities. Short-circuiting these networks of influence and these uncertain territories would significantly contribute to strengthening European security as a whole. That is why not only Chișinău, but also the EU, must act decisively in the Transnistrian file.